Loss of Control During Touch-and-Go Training

Loss of Control During Touch-and-Go Training

Pilot Name: Anomymous

This is not a case study from a manual. This is something that happened to me.

About twenty years ago, I was conducting training flights in a Cessna 206 with another qualified pilot. We were performing touch-and-go circuits and alternating control of the aircraft on each circuit as part of the training.

That day, weather conditions included moderate crosswind and noticeable turbulence. The operation was more demanding than usual, but still within what we considered acceptable for training.

After completing one touch-and-go from the right seat, control was transferred to the pilot in the left seat for the next takeoff. Power was applied normally and the takeoff roll initially felt standard. At rotation speed, everything changed.

The aircraft did not rotate.

Despite having the correct airspeed, the nose would not come up. The control forces felt abnormal, as if the aircraft were firmly attached to the runway. After several critical seconds, the aircraft briefly became airborne for only two or three seconds before settling back onto the runway.

Due to turbulence and unstable pitch control, the right main landing gear contacted the runway first. Almost immediately, the aircraft entered a severe porpoising condition, oscillating violently between the main landing gear and the nose gear.

Power was reduced immediately, but by that point the aircraft was already out of control. I distinctly remember the sound of the nose gear failing. With significant residual speed, the aircraft departed the runway surface and entered soft, muddy terrain. The nose gear collapsed completely, and the aircraft slid uncontrollably toward a nearby river, coming to rest at the edge of the water.

The aircraft was destroyed.

For a brief moment, the other pilot froze. I had to insist on evacuating the aircraft, as the door was on the left side. We eventually evacuated with only minor injuries.

The formal investigation did not provide a clear explanation. However, with time, experience, and a deeper understanding of human factors and operational risk, the real issue became clear to me.

We had a flawed company procedure.

During touch-and-go operations, we routinely transferred control on the ground, immediately after landing, while the aircraft was still rolling. The callout was simple: “You have control.” This gave the receiving pilot very little time to properly set flaps, verify pitch trim, stabilize the aircraft, and mentally prepare for the next takeoff.

Today, I am convinced that when two pilots are on board—even in light aircraft—control transfers must be deliberate, stabilized, and unambiguous. The safest moment to transfer control is in flight, with the aircraft stabilized, typically on downwind, not during a rushed ground phase following landing.

I believe that during that takeoff, the aircraft was excessively trimmed nose-down, preventing normal rotation. Combined with turbulence, crosswind, and limited situational awareness, the aircraft entered a porpoising condition from which recovery was no longer possible. At that time, we lacked both the training and awareness to recognize and properly recover from this phenomenon.

The aircraft was lost. I was fortunate to walk away.

Most accidents do not begin with system failures. They begin with procedures, habits, assumptions, and time pressure.

That experience changed the way I think about training, standardization, and safety. And it is one of the reasons why these stories matter.

Learning from a Porpoising Event During Touch-and-Go Training

Thank you for sharing this experience. During touch-and-go training operations in a Cessna 206, two qualified pilots were alternating aircraft control in the traffic pattern under moderate crosswind and turbulent conditions. Control was transferred on the ground immediately after landing, leaving limited time for aircraft configuration, trim verification, and mental preparation for the subsequent takeoff.

During the takeoff roll, the aircraft reached rotation speed but failed to rotate. Despite correct airspeed, the nose remained down, likely due to excessive nose-down trim. After briefly becoming airborne, the aircraft recontacted the runway and entered a severe porpoising condition, characterized by progressively worsening oscillations between the main landing gear and the nose gear. Although power was reduced promptly, the oscillations intensified, leading to nose gear structural failure, runway excursion, and complete loss of the aircraft. Both pilots evacuated with only minor injuries.

This experience highlights several critical lessons for aviation safety. Touch-and-go operations inherently increase workload and task saturation, particularly in challenging wind and turbulence. Control transfers conducted during high-workload phases can introduce latent risk, especially when aircraft configuration and trim are not fully verified. Effective SOP design should account for human limitations and ensure adequate time for setup, verification, and stabilization before critical phases of flight.

From a CRM perspective, this event underscores the importance of clear role definition, deliberate timing of control transfers, and active workload management. Decision-making was influenced by routine and normalization of deviance—continuing an operation because it had been completed successfully many times before. The lack of specific training on porpoising recognition and recovery further reduced the crew’s ability to arrest the oscillation once it developed.

Porpoising is not primarily a handling issue, but a decision-making challenge. Early recognition, immediate power reduction, steady control inputs, and a rejected takeoff are key to recovery. Attempting to force rotation or continue the takeoff can rapidly lead to structural failure.

Sharing experiences like this reinforces the value of CRM, disciplined procedures, and training beyond compliance. Learning from real-world events—without blame—helps crews recognize hidden risks, challenge routine practices, and strengthen safety margins before a minor deviation escalates into a serious accident.